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The Foreign Policy of Cities  
 
 
 
Introduction   
 
One of the most significant trends of the last decade has been the increasing 
prominence of cities on the world stage. ‘Global’ cities have developed a size, scope 
and reach that commands increasing weight in global issues. One result of this is that 
cities have begun to develop forms of diplomatic activity that seek to translate their 
increasing importance and growing capabilities into influence on aspects of global 
governance. With hundreds of formalised city networks, regular appearances at (and 
increasingly active roles in) major multilateral frameworks, as well as a now well-
established recognition by the media, the foreign policy of cities on the world stage 
can no longer go unnoticed.  
 
Yet this is a development that often drops off the radar of many scholars and 
practitioners of International Relations. This is because foreign policy has long been 
the unchallenged preserve of the state, heretofore the only entity with the legitimacy, 
authority and capacity to pursue a foreign policy.  
 
Yet scholars and practitioners are now progressively supporting the idea that cities, 
too, can conduct international relations and ‘diplomatic’ activities. i  This is by no 
means simply an academic endeavor: the well-known C40 Climate Leadership Group, 
which gathers 96 of the world’s largest metropolises representing 25% of world GDP, 
has a dedicated ‘city diplomacy’ team, and the World Health Organization has 
developed a city health diplomacy agenda as part of its Healthy Cities Network, to 
name but two of the many examples here.  
 
Building on this recognition for the value of thinking of cities not just as locally-
bounded actors,  we consider the ‘foreign policy’ of cities to consist in a city’s formal 
strategy in dealing with other governmental and non-governmental actors on an 
international stage.ii If aligned in logic to the traditional notions of ‘foreign policy’ 
circulating in International Relations theorizing (IR), the foreign policy of cities is 
however, to some degree, unlike that of states in that it relies even more extensively 
on specific forms of “network power” – the ability to convene and lead coalitions of 
actors towards specific governance outcomes – and far less on sovereign forms of 
power.iii This form of power is increasingly important in emerging regimes of global 
governance that characterize the shifting ground of international politics in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
In this article we show how and why cities increasingly flex their economic and 
political muscles. We look at the historical drivers that have generated new capacities 
for increasingly transnationally connected global cities. We then examine the 
diplomatic practices of cities today, and the different mechanisms, channels and 
capacities that enable those practices. We discuss some of the constraints cities face in 
developing foreign policies, as well as the differences between city diplomatic 
activity and traditional state foreign policy. Finally, we look at the different outcomes 
cities may pursue via their diplomatic activities, and discuss the significance of city 
diplomacy trends for how we think about the international system.  
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Running through the article is a tension that needs to be resolved at some point in the 
coming decades: a tension between cities that are globally connected, have 
transnational reach, are close to their citizens, and wield novel power in global 
governance, and the traditional state based logics of an international order that formed 
in a different age.  
 
 
The Drivers of City Diplomacy on the World Stage 
  
To speak of a ‘foreign policy’ for cities has really only become a meaningful question 
in the last decade or so. This is because cities have undergone a profound 
transformation over the last half century, the effects of which are now beginning to be 
felt. The scale, significance and capabilities of cities have been transformed by the 
political, economic and technological forces that we associate with contemporary 
globalization. As these forces transformed cities, cities in turn became central driving 
forces in the expansion of economic globalization, most crucially as sites of economic 
governance. The contingent inter-play of political, economic, technological and 
demographic trends in this period has generated new roles and capabilities for major 
cities. It is on this bedrock that cities have begun to translate their new status and 
changing governance capabilities into political objectives. 
 
An extensive literature on ‘global cities’ has emerged as an ongoing attempt to 
understand the nature of contemporary urban change.iv In particular, it has sought to 
understand the new role that cities began to play in the global economy after its 
restructuring in the 1970s. The collapse of the post-war ‘Bretton Woods’ framework 
of rules and institutions underpinning international commercial and financial 
transactions in that decade, and its replacement by a broadly neoliberal systemv of 
free markets and reduced capital controls, generated a new economic environment in 
which certain key cities became key strategic sites for economic governance. These 
regulatory changes, sometimes referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’, had the 
effect of supercharging global financial markets, relocating production to the cheaper 
labour markets of the developing world, and kick-starting a great expansion of the 
multi-national corporation. The advent of new digital information and 
communications technologies also facilitated this process of reorganizing global 
production. This heralded the creation of a new economic order in which the state 
retreated from many of the tasks of determining economic activity. It generated an 
economic governance gap that was filled by private firms operating from the central 
business districts of cities such as New York, Hong Kong or London, which became 
increasingly densely connected trans-national hubs of economic decision-making 
capabilities.vi 
 
These connections ‘super-charged’ certain cities, which used their inherent historical 
and economic advantages (in particular, the dynamics of urban agglomeration) to 
draw in much of the wealth and resources of the global economy. The scale of these 
dynamics has begun to reshape the planet. The United Nations has extensively 
documented how the number of cities in the world with populations greater than 1 
million increased from 75 in 1950 to 447 in 2011, while during the same period the 
average size of the world’s 100 largest cities increased from 2 to 7.6 million. In the 
decade between 1990 and 2000 alone there was a 30% increase in the size of urban 
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settlements in the developed world and a 50% increase in the developing world. Such 
a demographic earthquake represents a qualitative and quantitative shift in human 
society, generating urban entities of a size and scope to rival all but the very largest 
states. In fact, several urbanists argue now that cities are so prominent on a global 
scale that we should be really speaking of ‘planetary urbanization’, and that no corner 
of the Earth is free from the influence of the urban.vii 
 
Despite the key role of global economic restructuring in generating urban 
transformation, we should note that this form of economic globalization was also 
profoundly political. The creation of the global market in which cities have thrived 
has been underpinned by a geopolitical order shaped by US hegemony.viii Global 
cities expanded rapidly in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the 
liberal world order extended its reach. 
 
One further driver of city influence on the world stage has become increasingly 
significant in recent years. It is related to the scale at which many of the most pressing 
problems of world politics now exist. Issues such as climate change, transnational 
terrorism or financial regulation need to be tackled at the global scale. But the 
international society of states finds itself increasingly unable to efficiently govern this 
global complexity.  
 
It is here that cities offer interesting new possibilities for new forms of twenty-first 
century global governance. By coming together in transnational networks, cities have 
offered the possibility of an emergent political assemblage that can offer forms of 
governance that can match the scale and complexity of global challenges. The new 
technical capacities offered by digital networks have meant that it is increasingly 
possible for mayors to straddle the local and the global scales. This had led to the 
formation of many new transnational metropolitan networks, aimed at various forms 
of global governance. They operate at a variety of different scales: from the national, 
regional, to the transnational, and with various aims and levels of effectiveness. 
 
Some of our recent empirical research has evidenced the increasing influence of “city 
networks”.ix  It is undeniable that a marked growth in these city-to-city diplomatic 
initiatives can be detected over the last two decades: if at least 60 were active in 1985, 
this number had nearly doubled by the late 1990s (circa 120 by 1999) and again by 
the early 2000s (circa 200 by 2009), and, as noted above, it seems to be growing 
steadily today somewhere between 250 and 300 organised associations of cities 
globally.x Since the early 1990s, in particular, international relations have seen the 
emergence of major international efforts like ICLEI Local Governments for 
Sustainability, which has been foundational in including a ‘local’ emphasis on the UN 
sustainable development framework of the 1992 Rio summit and its ‘Agenda 21’. 
This has even accelerated in the last decade, with the emergence on the international 
scene of, for instance, the aforementioned C40 (founded in 2005) which has had a 
prime spot in the development and implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate 
change; of UCLG (United Cities and Local Governments, founded in 2004) which 
plays a key role in many UN frameworks; or the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities 
initiative (2013) that has channelled over $100m in direct investment to strengthen 
resilience planning in cities. 
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Transnational governance networks such as these represent a vast scale jumping 
planetary network, linking local actions to global governance outcomes, independent 
of state government activities. In this article we give specific focus to global 
networks, such as the C40, which have a transnational reach, and enrol multiple 
agents (Transnational Corporations, Non-Governmental Organisations, the UN 
system). As we noted in other research, these are by no means just networks of 
‘Northern’ or ‘Western’ cities: they cover a vast variety of topical foci beyond the 
environment, and span the globe in many varied ways, constituting today a central 
force when it comes to networking local governments beyond their local remits.xi 
 
We are seeing, increasingly, a move from cities to extend their impact on the global 
stage from economic governance to political governance. This deep-lying tension 
within the structure of international society is why the issue of the strategic direction 
and policy orientation of cities is increasingly important. But it also generates a 
growing tension between cities and states, and problematizes a relationship that has 
been settled in a specific way since the advent of Westphalian sovereignty – since 
when the city has been increasingly internalized within the state. The new capacities 
of cities offer the prospect of this relationship being renegotiated – and we need to see 
if states and cities will be partners in global governance or whether they will 
increasingly come into conflict with each other – as they have, for example, with the 
Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change.xii  
 
In the next section we examine some of the existing practices of cities on the 
international stage, before returning to this increasingly problematized relationship 
between the city, the state and global scaled governance.  
 
The Diplomatic Practices of Cities 
 
If we consider the international muscle that cities might have in world affairs, we 
must see cities not as passive ‘venues’ for international relations, nor as a purely 
subjugated context of ‘higher’ politics. On the contrary, local governments can be 
effective actors shaping the dynamics of global governance. Certainly, the rhetoric 
espoused by most of the major global advocacy initiatives involving cities, such as 
Mayors for Peace or the Global Covenant of Mayors, tends to demonstrate this 
capacity to go beyond their local purview.xiii The extent and persistence over the last 
two decades of the internationalisation of city-led initiatives is a clear sign that cities 
can partake actively in the architecture of world politics beyond inter-national 
relations.xiv  
 
A typical representation of this is the often-cited assertion that, while “nations talk, 
cities act”. Variously attributed to a number of city leaders, the statement embodies 
much of the ethos of the leadership of former Mayor of New York, Michael 
Bloomberg, in his tenure (2010-2013) as chair of the C40 Climate Leadership Group. 
In short, cities are ‘out there’ in world politics, lobbying, linking, planning and 
cooperating.  
 
The capacity to link transnationally, negotiate and collaborate with both multilateral 
and multinational private worlds, and carry ‘international’ agendas is, as we have 
seen, increasingly crucial to addressing global challenges like climate, migration, 
health and resilience, which increasingly transcend national borders and the capacities 
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and political will of states to address them.xv Today, an important portion of these 
hundreds of city networking activities can be identified as “city diplomacy”, which 
we define as: mediated ‘international’ relations between rightful representatives of 
polities (cities in this instance), that result in agreements, collaborations, further 
institution-building and cooperation across boundaries.xvi For instance, within the 
framework of networks like C40, ‘ambassadors’ of cities (elected mayors, or their 
peers) such as London or Seoul negotiate common frameworks and partake in 
collective action on behalf of their urban dwellers. Normatively, they create joint 
commitments like the 2010 Mexico City Pact on Climate or the 2009 Istanbul Water 
Consensus, and often do so in collaboration with multilateral organisations, as with 
the case of the World Health Organisation and the 2016 Shanghai Consensus on 
Healthy Cities on the implementation of SDGs in health at local level. But this goes 
beyond frame development into implementation, funding and assistance. UCLG and 
C40 have for instance recently convened an ‘Urban20’ within the context of the 2018  
Group of 20. ICLEI has supported the implementation of a ‘Cities’ dimension of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), now including a specific cities 
special report in its 7th assessment. Eurocities has been a key voice in the 
development of an Urban Agenda for the European Union. The examples are many 
and increasing. 
 
All of this evidence points at the city’s capacity to connect and focus different actors, 
catalyse action by networking, and deploy the powers of collaboration. This is of 
course a quite different form of power to the more familiar and traditional model of 
sovereign state power. Wielding network power means that, in practice, the city’s 
influence is never really stabilised, and is always shared with other actors, peers and 
flows. This is a peculiar positioning that cities currently enjoy in the complex 
landscape of global governance. As Mikael Roman pointed out, cities can now govern 
“from the middle”: they are not intrinsically bound by the ‘high politics’ of relations 
among nation-states, and yet neither are they bottom-up or NGO-like actors (contra 
some often misleading accounts).xvii This position not only empowers cities – it also 
offers a potential avenue out of the impasse that state diplomacy often finds itself in 
when it comes to questions of collective action and the global commons. City 
networks offer a new channel to pursue governance outcomes – and the C40, for 
example, has generated a number of very specific governance solutions to climate 
change where states have been stuck at the negotiating table. In the case of the C40 
such outcomes include developing joint coordination, sharing best practice and 
technical know-how in areas such as transportation, energy and waste infrastructures, 
and retrofitting projects. The C40 has stimulated over 14,000 climate actions amongst 
its members over the last six years.xviii WHO Healthy Cities networks (e.g. in Europe 
or in the Asia-Pacific) are taking practical and applied steps to include health 
priorities across sectors in local policymaking.   
 
Local governments, and their city leaders, have helped to accomplish unprecedented 
rates of globalization. But they remain, at present, firmly ensconced in a broadly 
neoliberal discourse in which the competitive and entrepreneurial city vies 
uncomfortably with collaboration. They are also partially responsible for the growing 
entrenchment of the private sector in service or infrastructure delivery. They are 
pivotal to contemporary geographies of global governance. City networks like the 
C40 also flag that we are now witnessing a shift in the direction of city foreign 
engagements. For decades, especially during the Cold War, cities’ international 
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relations were mostly limited to peer-to-peer cooperation. Now we see the return of 
more explicitly entrepreneurial, public-private ‘hybrid’ urban policies (a development 
that invites historical parallels with pre-modern city-states). Traditional twinning 
organizations, such as Sister Cities International (SCI), have themselves stepped away 
from more specific “city-to-city cooperation” (between cities) to a wider ‘city 
diplomacy’ (between cities and other non-municipal actors).xix  Networks (such as 
SCI) are shifting, moving from an emphasis on the importance of twinning to an 
emphasis on the importance of strategy and alliance capability. xx  The form and 
orientation of current city networks has therefore been going well beyond twinning: 
city networks are being constructed in partnership with actors other than municipal 
governments, such as the UN, the World Bank or the EU, and are increasingly 
intertwined with the cross-national action of the private sector. In some cases, the 
private sector can even be the initiator of such city networking efforts. 
 
This is exemplified by the case of New York’s city diplomacy, which puts 
entrepreneurial communications at its heart. In New York Foreign Affairs is 
conducted mainly within the Office of the Mayor by a dedicated Commissioner for 
International Affairs, whose main role is therefore to act on behalf of the Mayor in 
liaising with the various international actors. On one hand, the Office manages 
relations with the hundreds of consulates and international organizations housed in the 
city. This is a form of informal diplomacy whereby the city exerts its influence on 
international governments through the well-coordinated and deliberate welcome it 
gives them. On the other hand, the office also oversees a not-for profit organization 
called Global Partners Inc., set up by the city to upscale its old ‘sister city’ system. 
Testimony to the confidence and handling that major cities now have of the 
contemporary neoliberal order is the fact, for instance, that New York approaches this 
side of its international diplomacy like a corporate consultancy. Though located inside 
the Mayor’s Office for International Affairs, the organization has its own independent 
board of directors charged with managing the institution effectively and profitably. 
Together, they coordinate a number of Global Partners Inc. summits and conferences 
as well as a large youth program aimed at fostering informal diplomacy through 
young people.  To an extent, then, we can note a move in the direction of privatization 
of city diplomatic activity, which goes beyond both the mayor’s office and local 
government. This type of city diplomacy takes on an entrepreneurial character, shaped 
by the dominant discourses and practices of liberal world order.  
 
 
Constraints on City Diplomacy 
 
Despite being empowered by the current configuration of world politics, cities also 
face various constraints. Cities, as Jennifer Robinson puts it, exist in a “world of 
cities”. This consideration presents a key limitation to the collaborative spirit that the 
foreign policy of today’s urban settlements might take in a world that, whilst made of 
cities, is also still solidly hinged on a global order based on markets, limited resources 
and competition. This means, in practice, that cities are often treading a fine line 
between collaborative, networked, efforts (like Mayors for Peace, the Metropolis 
network of major metropolitan areas, or United Cities and Local Government) and 
pressing local needs to maintain their cities as attractive and economically vibrant on 
a global stage. So, for instance, while the slogan ‘#LondonisOpen’ shows London’s 
desire to lead global cities in internationally collaborative initiatives like the C40 
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Climate Leadership Group, London’s strategy is also to remain an “internationally 
competitive and successful city”, envisaging itself as a prime global placing for 
business, innovation and market hubs. In this sense cities seem today to be walking a 
fine line between competition and collaboration with other cities, if not with 
international actors more generally. A key determinant of this behaviour, of course, is 
the well-recognised state of resource constraint that cities are currently operating in – 
often unable to capture their own tax base, set their own budgets autonomously, or 
break out of the legal frameworks set by state legislatures. 
 
A similar consideration on the fine balance between competition and collaboration 
can be made for the relationship between cities and states. Does the ‘rise’ of the city 
imply the demise of the state? If cities are catalysing international efforts, and if they 
have a millennial legacy of global engagements, will we then do away with inter-
national institutions? Globally visible mayors like Michael Bloomberg have, in the 
past few years, publicly criticised international processes in opposition to the real, 
pragmatic actions of city leaders. For instance, in a 2011 interview with the BBC, 
Bloomberg reiterated that, at the “national, international and state levels,” there is “an 
awful lot of hot air” on climate change, and declared that “it is up to mayors” to solve 
environmental problems. xxi  If we account for the thousands of climate actions 
undertaken in Bloomberg’s city network then (C40 Cities), and multiply that by at 
least two hundred similar city networks efforts by city leaders, cities might have a 
case that they can fill the governance gaps that states have failed to plug. We can find 
a further example of cities utilising transnational networks to bypass inadequate state 
governance provision in the realm of security. For example, after September 11th 
2001, the city of New York responded to what it perceived to be the failure of the 
state to adequately protect it by fostering global security governance networks, 
seeking to develop its own institutional capacities for counter-terrorism, and 
developing transnational intelligence gathering capabilities in collaboration with other 
municipal authorities around the world.xxii 
 
Does this mean, then, that we are set up for an epochal confrontation between cities 
and states? Or, rather, is this a time ripe for collaboration between national and local 
governments? While the former, more sensationalist, option has gained some 
currency in media and academia, and with the rhetorical flourishes of some mayors, it 
might be the more measured latter case where the current role of cities in global order 
holds most promise.  
 
Interestingly, Bloomberg himself, along with several other mayors, more recently 
adopted the latter tone. In his 2015 Foreign Affairs article on the “city century”, he in 
fact asserted that cities cannot replace the nation-state in pursuing solutions to 
poverty, security, disease, or trade. Rather he noted: “city leaders seek not to displace 
their national counterparts but to be full partners in their work—an arrangement that 
national leaders increasingly view as not just beneficial but also necessary.” At least 
in the short to medium term, we need not pit cities against states, but think of cities 
and states: a critical collaborative juncture in which cities can lead a transformation of 
ageing international institutions and set a roadmap beyond state-centric gridlocks.  
 
An initiative like the ‘Urban20’ speaks of this more collaborative city/state spirit. Yet 
we should not forget the confrontation spurred by, for instance, populist and 
conservative movements in the UK and US, to name but two, where the Trump White 
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House withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change, or the May 
government’s Brexit plan, have led to vivid reactions by coalitions of mayors and 
local leaders that seem to pit major ‘global’ cosmopolitan and ‘open’ cities against 
reactionary national governments. So, whilst the tone of collaboration might have 
been swinging in the direction of greater city/state partnership in the past decade, the 
(geo)politics of states and state-centric international relations might, in 2018, have set 
back greater alignment where it might be most needed. 
 
 
The Goals of City Diplomacy 
 
As cities increasingly realise their political and economic governance capabilities and 
growing strength, it becomes important that they have a clear direction and strategy 
for what they want to achieve. At present, this is largely lacking. Nascent forays by 
local and metropolitan authorities into global governance and city diplomacy 
currently focus largely on single issues such as climate change, health or security, 
have emerged in an ad-hoc fashion, and tend to be driven by technocratic agendas. 
One reason for this is that, as we have said, cities are often competing for resources as 
much as they are testing co-operation via networks. Finding broad, strategic goals in 
common can be difficult in this mixed context. There remain very limited efforts at 
strategic alignment between sectors, and at strategic thinking, when it comes to 
developing coherent foreign policies by cities big and small, where opportunism still 
reigns as the main modus operandi in city diplomacy.  
 
In this section we conclude by examining the policy goals that cities are pursuing, via 
the multiple governance channels we have mentioned. We distinguish between short, 
medium and long-term timeframes. This enables us to move between immediate goals 
that cities are currently pursuing, and more longue duree structural shifts in the 
international system that forays into city diplomacy and global governance might 
signify. The rise of city diplomacy is not simply about sub-state politics. We submit 
that it is far more significant than that: it is an indication of a more significant 
structural shift in the foundations of international society, driven by those factors we 
identified earlier as driving global city formation.  
 
In the short term, cities are very much concerned, as they always have been, with 
governing the everyday and the mundane.  At the same time, capturing economic 
growth and attracting talent and resources into the city is also at the core of urban 
strategies - and this places cities into competition with each other for finite resources. 
More recently cities have pursued eye-catching global governance outcomes in issues 
such as climate change, resilience, health, security via transnational networks and 
public private collaboration, as we have seen. These efforts are sometimes parallel to 
traditional state diplomacy, but often they engage with international organizations and 
states. Moreover, cities are increasingly recognised within the UN system not just as 
places for action but as actors and partners in their own right. Aligning themselves 
with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seems to be, in the short term, 
the closest that cities have come to articulating a collective policy direction. 
 
A tangible expression of this is the United Nations’ New Urban Agenda that emerged 
from the Habitat III conference in Quito in 2016.xxiii The New Urban Agenda captures 
the twin goals of market led economic growth and development, and the desire to 
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produce more socially just and sustainable cities – setting out aspirations (often 
falling short of implementation) around equality in urban settings, environmental 
sustainability and resilience, poverty reduction, and liveability. Reconciling these two 
impulses – growth and social justice - is going to be perhaps the core challenge of the 
twenty-first century. But Quito provided very few answers for reconciling the 
tensions between them. In fact, it is increasingly the case that attention to the New 
Urban Agenda has been fizzling out, as the broader discourse of the SDGs, but also 
specific agendas around climate change or cooperation in the wake of populist 
nationalism, have been taking over the spotlight. 
 
However, the ability of frameworks like the SDGs, New Urban Agenda, and parts of 
the Paris Agreement or the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, to orient 
efforts at urban development show the importance of the UN System in coordinating 
and catalysing city diplomacy at the present moment. At the same time, and 
continuing to reflect our theme of tension between city networks and state based 
diplomatic logics, the increasing prominence of cities within the UN system has also 
sparked tensions with states such as Russia, who see it as a dangerous precedent 
indicating the possible erosion of the principle of state sovereignty.xxiv 
 
In the medium term we might envisage that cities begin to embody the principles of 
these agendas in their material forms, shaping both the agendas and themselves in the 
process. There is recognition of the need to reshape cities to meet the challenges of 
the twenty-first century, via new forms of governance, repurposing technologies, and 
harnessing the power of design. So we hear much about ambitions to generate Smart 
Cities, Resilient Cities, Sustainable Cities and Healthy Cities. Strategies to attempt to 
generate such idealised urban forms represent key medium-term governance goals for 
cities’ networked diplomacy. 
 
Finally, in the longer term, it is not inconceivable that these developments might 
signal a very significant structural tension between the growing weight of cities, and 
the fading strength of the territorial sovereign state. We have noted the multiple signs 
of this tension in the contemporary city/state relation. But decades from now this 
issue may be far more prominent. There is also a growing tension between a city-
based political order and state-based institutions like the UN, where the role of cities 
remains opaque and potentially destabilizing of established norms and procedures. 
 
Some of the larger cities and urban regions have, in recent decades, generated 
astonishing levels of growth and economic power, are linked transnationally by the 
most advanced technological infrastructures on the planet, have reach that stretches 
across traditional state boundaries, and have populations so large that they begin to 
destabilise traditional understandings of what international politics is. Cities are 
beginning to realise their power in both economic and political governance, and act as 
important ‘norm-entrepreneurs’: generating some of the normative content and aims 
behind emerging global agendas such as sustainability and resilience. A global 
network of thousands of linked cities affords a vast reservoir of human capital and 
creativity that will develop in unexpected directions in this century. 
 
Some have speculated that perhaps one of those long-term directions will be the 
development of new forms of political life that finally challenge the territorial nation-
state as the locus of modern life and legitimacy, and can offer solutions that match the 
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multi-scalar nature of the governance challenges of an increasingly planetary politics. 
Might we eventually see the emergence of some form of historically novel political 
assemblage that can unite the various scales of governance, from the local to the 
global, more effectively, and more democratically, than states have managed – 
something like Benjamin Barber’s ‘Global Parliament of Mayors’?xxv  
 
Such a world is certainly not imminent. Equally, states and state-centric processes are 
still very much in the driving seat when it comes to global frameworks and agenda-
setting. The role of large private and philanthropic sector actors in both shaping this 
system as much as often facilitating city diplomacy should not be underplayed. But 
what is increasingly clear is that cities can, and increasingly are, playing a key role in 
the international system as it adapts to the complex global problems of the twenty-
first century.  
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